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ABSTRACT
With public information becoming widely accessible and
shared on today’s web, greater insights are possible into
crowd actions by citizens and non-state actors such as large
protests and cyber activism. We present efforts to predict
the occurrence, specific timeframe, and location of such ac-
tions before they occur based on public data collected from
over 300,000 open content web sources in 7 languages, from
all over the world, ranging from mainstream news to gov-
ernment publications to blogs and social media. Using natu-
ral language processing, event information is extracted from
content such as type of event, what entities are involved and
in what role, sentiment and tone, and the occurrence time
range of the event discussed. Statements made on Twitter
about a future date from the time of posting prove partic-
ularly indicative. We consider in particular the case of the
2013 Egyptian coup d’e´tat. The study validates and quanti-
fies the common intuition that data on social media (beyond
mainstream news sources) are able to predict major events.
Keywords
Web and social media mining, Twitter analysis, Crowd be-
havior, Forecasting, Event extraction, Temporal analytics,
Sentiment analysis, Online activism
1. INTRODUCTION
The manifestation of crowd actions such as mass demon-
strations often involves collective reinforcement of shared
ideas. In today’s online age, much of this public conscious-
ness and comings together has a significant presence online
where issues of concern are discussed and calls to arms are
publicized. The Arab Spring is oft cited as an example of
the new importance of online media in the formation of mass
protests [6]. While the issue of whether mobilization occurs
online is highly controversial, that nearly all crowd behavior
in the internet-connected world has some presence online is
not. So while it may be infeasible to predict an action de-
veloping in secret in a single person’s mind, the ready acces-
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sibility to public information on the web that future crowds
may now be reading and reacting to or members of which
are now posting on social media can offer glimpses into the
formation of this crowd and the action it may take.
News from mainstream sources from all over the world
can now be accessed online and about 500 million tweets are
posted on Twitter each day with this rate growing steadily
[14]. Blogs and online forums have become a common med-
ium for public discourse and many government publications
are offered for free online. We here investigate the potential
of this publicly available information online for predicting
mass actions that are so significant that they garner wide
mainstream attention from around the world. Because these
are events perpetrated by human actions, they are in a way
endogenous to the system, enabling prediction.
But while all this information is in theory public and ac-
cessible and could lead to important insights, gathering it all
and making sense of it is a formidable task. We here use data
collected by Recorded Future (www.recordedfuture.com).
Scanning over 300,000 different open content web sources in
7 different languages and from all over the world, mentions
of events—in the past, current, or said to occur in future—
are continually extracted at a rate of approximately 50 ex-
tractions per second. Using natural language processing,
the type of event, the entities involved and how, and the
timeframe for the event’s occurrence are resolved and made
available for analysis. With such a large dataset of what is
being said online ready to be processed by a computer pro-
gram, the possibilities are infinite. For one, as shown herein,
the gathering of crowds into a single action can often be seen
through trends appearing in this data far in advance.
We here study the cases of mass protests and politically
motivated cyber campaigns involving an entity of interest,
such as a country, city, or organization. We use historical
data of event mentions online, in particular forward-looking
mentions of events yet to take place, to forecast the occur-
rence of these in the future. We can make predictions about
particular timeframes in the future with high accuracy.
We find that the mass of publicly available information
online has the power to unveil the future actions of crowds.
Measuring the trends in sheer numbers we are here able to
accurately predict protests in countries and in cities and
large cyber campaigns by target and by perpetrator. After
assembling our prediction mechanism for significant protests,
we investigate the case of the 2013 Egyptian coup d’e´tat and
how well we were able to foresee the protests surrounding it.
The ability to forecast these things has important ramifi-
cations. Countries and cities faced with a high likelihood of
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significant protest can prepare themselves and their citizens
to avoid any unnecessary violence and damages. Companies
with personnel and supply chain operations can ask their
employees to stay at home and to remain apolitical and can
attempt to safeguard their facilities in advance. Countries,
companies, and organizations faced with possible cyber cam-
paigns against them can beef up their cyber security in an-
ticipation of attacks or even preemptively address the cause
for the anger directed at them.
Recent work has used online media to glean insight into
consumer behavior. In [2] the authors mine Twitter for in-
sights into consumer demand with an application to fore-
casting movie earnings. In [8] the authors use blog chat-
ter captured by IBM’s WebFountain [7] to predict Amazon
book sales. These works are similar to this one in that they
employ very large data sets and observe trends in crowd
behavior by huge volumes. Online web searches have been
used to describe consumer behavior, most notably in [3] and
[5], and to predict movements in the stock market in [4].
In [13] the authors study correlations between singular
events with occurrence defined by coverage in the New York
Times. By studying when does one target event ensue an-
other specified event sometime in the future, the authors
discover truly novel correlations between events such as be-
tween natural disasters and disease outbreaks. Here we are
interested in the power of much larger, more social, and more
varied datasets in pointing out early trends in endogenous
processes (actions by people discussed by people) that can
help predict all occurrences of an event and pinning down
when they will happen, measuring performance with respect
to each time window for prediction. One example of the im-
portance of a varied dataset that includes both social media
and news in Arabic is provided in the next section.
We here seek to study the predictive power of such web
intelligence data and not simply the power of standard ma-
chine learning algorithms (e.g. random forests vs. SVMs).
Therefore we present only the learning machine (random for-
est in the case of predicting protests) that performed best on
the training data and compare it to a data-poor maximum-
likelihood random-walk predictor that predicts for the fu-
ture the situation today. The data used in this study has
been made available for download at www.nathankallus.
com/PredictingCrowdBehavior/.
We first discuss what predictive signals we expect to find
in order to motivate our constructions. We then review how
mentions of events, entities, and times are extracted from
the wide breadth of sources. Using this data we develop a
predictive mechanism to predict significant protests in coun-
tries and in cities. We consider the case of the 2013 Egyp-
tian coup d’e´tat and conclude. In an appendix we consider
finding more general patterns in the data, motivating an
application of the na¨ıve Bayes classifier to high-dimensional
sequence mining in massive datasets, which we use to fore-
cast cyber attack campaigns by target or perpetrator.
2. PREDICTIVE SIGNALS IN PUBLIC DATA
We begin by exemplifying anecdotally the precursory sig-
nals that exist in public data for large protests. On Sunday
June 9, 2013 a Beirut protest against Hezbollah’s interfer-
ence in Syria turned violent when clashes with Hezbollah
supporters left one protester dead [11]. The story was widely
reported on June 9 including in Western media, attracting
more mainstream news attention than any protest event in
Lebanon in over a year marking it as a significant protest.
But not only were there signs that the protest would oc-
cur before it did, there were signs it may be large and it
may turn violent. The day before, Algerian news source En-
nahar published an article with the headline “Lebanese fac-
tion organizes two demonstrations tomorrow rejecting the
participation of Hezbollah in the fighting in Syria” (trans-
lated from Arabic using Google Translate). There was little
other preliminary mainstream coverage and no coverage (to
our knowledge) appeared in mainstream media outside of
the Middle-East-North-Africa (MENA) region or in any lan-
guage other than Arabic. Moreover, without further context
there would be little evidence to believe that this protest, if
it occurs at all, would become large enough or violent enough
to garner mainstream attention from around the world.
However, already by June 5, four days earlier, there were
many Twitter messages calling people to protest on Sunday,
saying “Say no to #WarCrimes and demonstrate against
#Hezbollah fighting in #Qusayr on June 9 at 12 PM in
Downtown #Beirut” and “Protest against Hezbollah being
in #Qusair next Sunday in Beirut.” In addition, discussion
around protests in Lebanon has included particularly vio-
lent words in days prior. A June 6 article in TheBlaze.com
reported, “Fatwa Calls For Suicide Attacks Against Hezbol-
lah,” and a June 4 article in the pan-Arabian news portal
Al Bawaba reported that, “Since the revolt in Syria, the se-
curity situation in Lebanon has deteriorated.” A May 23
article in The Huffington Post mentioned that, “The re-
volt in Syria has exacerbated tensions in Lebanon, which
... remains deeply divided.” Within this wider context, un-
derstood through the lens of web-accessible public informa-
tion such as mainstream reporting from around the world
and social media, there was a significant likelihood that the
protest would be large and turn violent. These patterns
persist across time; see Figure 1.
It is these predictive signals that we would like to mine
from the web and employ in a learning machine in order
to forecast significant protests and other crowd behavior.
In this case, it is critical that we spread a wide net on
many sources so to catch mentions in non-Western media
and foreign-language Tweets along with mentions in media
(such as Reuters) and languages (such as English) with a
more global reach.
3. EVENT EXTRACTION AND TEMPORAL
ANALYSIS
To quantify these signals we will look at time-stamped
event-entity data. The data harvesting process extracts
mentions of events from the plethora of documents continu-
ally gathered from the over 300,000 sources being monitored.
An important aspect is that the event mentions are tagged
Mainstream news
Forward-looking tweets
915 101 1015 111 1115 Day
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100
Reports of protest in Lebanon by publish day
Figure 1: Number of same-day news reports of protest in
Lebanon (red) and tweets mentioning protests said to occur
over the next three days (blue). Red spikes often follow blue
spikes or otherwise have a recognizable convex ramp-up.
with the time range in which the event is said to occur in the
mention so that forward-looking statements, such as plans
to protest, can be directly tied to a future time and place.
Event extractions are done in Arabic, English, Farsi, French,
Russian, Spanish, and Simplified and Traditional Chinese.
There are several elements in the event, entity, and time
extraction process. For each document mined from the web,
an ensemble of off-the-shelf natural language processing tools
are used to extract tokens (lemma, root, stem, and part of
speech) and entities. Entities extracted by each tool are
then combined and resolved into a database of canonical
entities for disambiguation. Documents are categorized by
topic. Entities that are not agreed upon by the various tools
and are far-fetched given the topic are rejected. Ontologies
of structured entity relationships constructed from online s-
ources (such as DBpedia) are used to guide filtering and
provide a gazetteer for additional entity extraction.
Given the set of filtered entities, a statement extractor
links these entities to events stated in the document. Events
are again extracted using an ensemble method of off-the-
shelf tools and a custom made tool that relies on the above
tokenization. Each event from the various extraction sources
is matched up with a particular text fragment from the docu-
ment that best represents it. Next, n-grams in the document
are matched against phrase lists organized by sentiment or
tone and the fraction of these in the fragment is recorded.
All time statements made in the document are separately
extracted. The tokenization of the document is parsed by
a dependency grammar using the data-driven parser Malt-
Parser [10] to construct a dependency graph of the docu-
ment. This is used to find time statements, both relative
(e.g. “next summer”) and absolute. Comprehending these
in machine time is based on several contextual cues. Cul-
tural and regional categorizations are extracted from the
document to inform such things as relevant hemisphere for
seasons, which is the first day of the week, standard date
formats (month first or day first), and timezone. Moreover,
contexts such as publishing date are noted. Using these,
all time statements made in the document are converted to
standardized time-stamps, with specificity varying from sec-
ond to year. Event mentions are then matched up with the
most relevant time statement to the event statement based
on sentence dependency.
In all, events are marked by type of event, time range
of event, entities involved, role of entities involved, entities
mentioned, sentiment and tone, and origin. Some post-
processing is done on the event-entity level to further im-
prove quality based on special curated ontologies. For ex-
ample, known hacker groups such as Anonymous constitute
one such ontology and if mentioned in a cyber event but
not clearly as the perpetrator these are assumed to be so
nonetheless. Similarly, impossible events are rejected. For
example, one ontology keeps track of death dates of people
based primarily on information harvested from Wikipedia
and assists in rejecting the event “Marco Polo will travel to
China in 2015” as impossible because Marco Polo is dead.
The precision of event extraction is measured by work-
ers on the Amazon Mechanical Turk (mturkers). To test
the precision of time-stamping, for each language language-
specific Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) are constructed for
a random sample. Each HIT consists of the text fragment,
the extracted time-stamp, and the question “is extracted
time right or wrong?” and is given to three mturkers. It
Country All Twitter Country All Twitter
Afghanistan 60918 27655 Lebanon 44153 23394
Bahrain 246136 177310 Libya 162721 69437
Egypt 944998 397105 Nigeria 70635 38700
Greece 122416 70521 Pakistan 289643 213636
India 491475 274027 S. Arabia 39556 13670
Indonesia 34007 17120 Sudan 28680 13654
Iran 118704 53962 Syria 212815 79577
Italy 65569 43803 Tunisia 99000 27233
Jordan 35396 19369 Yemen 70583 16712
Table 1: Protest event mentions in the corpus.
is declared successful if at least two answer “right.” For ex-
ample, the precision of time-stamping in both English and
Spanish is measured at 93%, in Arabic at 90%, and in Simpli-
fied Chinese at 82%. The precision of the event extraction is
measured similarly by type. Protest events in English come
in at 84%. Malware threat events in English come in at 96%
and in Simplified Chinese at 90%.
4. PREDICTING SIGNIFICANT PROTESTS
We now turn our attention to the use of this event data
to the prediction of significant protests around the world.
Our first forecasting question will revolve around predict-
ing significant protests on the country level and considering
that country alone. That is, a significant protest is one that
receives much more same-day mainstream reporting than is
usual for that country. So while most days a business with
supply chain operations in Egypt operate under the usual
volatile circumstances (since 2011) of Egypt—certainly more
volatile than, say, Jordan and receiving much more atten-
tion for it—they are interested in receiving advance notice of
protests that are going to be larger and more dangerous than
the ordinary for Egypt. The same for another milieu. At the
same time, we will use past patterns from other countries to
inform the prediction mechanism when making a prediction
about one country. In fact, the prediction mechanism will
not be knowledgeable of the particular country in question
but instead just the type of country, quantified by cluster
membership. In an appendix we also investigate the ques-
tion of predicting protests that are significant relative to a
common baseline and on the city level instead.
We restrict to a selection of 18 countries: Afghanistan,
Bahrain, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Jor-
dan, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Su-
dan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. We will consider all protest
event mentions in any of these countries being published
any time between January 1, 2011 and July 10, 2013 as the
event mention corpus. January 1, 2011 up to March 5, 2013
will serve for supervised training (and validation by cross-
validation) and since March 6, 2013 up to July 10, 2013 will
serve for test and performance scoring. Let
Mcs(i, j) =
Number of event mentions of protest in
country c taking place on day j extracted
from documents published on day i from
sources of type s
We tabulate some totals of these numbers over the whole
event mention corpus in Table 1. For example, nearly one
million mentions of a protest event in Egypt occur in the
data, over a third of a million on Twitter.
4.1 The Ground Set
For each country, the protests we are interested in fore-
casting are those that are significant enough to garner more-
than-usual real-time coverage in mainstream reporting for
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"fifth day of fighting that
has posed greatest crisis to
the country since the fall
of President Hosni Mubarak
in February" –NYTimes 112311
"Crowds of several
hundred thousands
... mark the first
anniversary of
uprising" –CBS
News 12512
"The death toll ... rose to 12 ... clashes
set off by a deadly soccer riot a few
days earlier" –NYTimes 2512
"Angry protests erupted inside
and outside the court as the
former president..." –CNN 6212
"Protesters Scale
U.S. Embassy
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wn American
Flag" –Time
91112
"Mursi defends new
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... with tear gas fired
at demonstrators and
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–BBC 112312
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Figure 2: Normalized count of mainstream reports M ′′c (i) in Egypt with annotations for stretches above θ = 2.875 (red line).
the country. That is, there is a significant protest in coun-
try c on day i if Mc,Mainstream(i, i) is higher than usual for
country c (in an appendix we consider an absolute scale for
protest significance which naturally boosts predictability).
Since new sources are being added daily by the hundreds
or thousands to the Recorded Future source bank, there is
a heterogeneous upward trend in the event mention data
and what is more than usual in counts changes. To remove
this trend we normalize the mention counts by the average
volume in the trailing three months. That is, we let
M ′cs(i, i+ k) =
Mcs(i, i+ k)
1
|Countries|×90
∑
c′∈Countries
∑i−1
j=i−90Mc′s(j, j + k)
where Countries is the 18 countries. Next we define the
training-set average of same-day mainstream reporting
M ′c =
1
|Train|
∑
i∈Train
M ′c,Mainstream(i, i)
where Train denotes the set of days in the training set.
Moreover, to smooth the data we consider a three-day
moving average. Then we say, by definition, that a signifi-
cant protest in country c (and relative to country c) occurs
during the days i− 1, i, i+ 1 if
M ′′c (i) =
1
3
i+1∑
j=i−1
M ′c,Mainstream(j, j)
M ′c
≥ θ
is larger than a threshold θ. The threshold is chosen so to
select only significant protests. By inspecting the data’s cor-
respondence to the largest protests, we set θ = 2.875 (which
is also nearly the 94th percentile of the standard exponen-
tial distribution). Overall across all countries considered,
this resulted in 6% of 3-day stretches to be labeled positive,
distributed mostly evenly among the countries.
An example plot of M ′′c (i) for Egypt is shown in Figure
2 with annotations of top mainstream news describing the
protests in each stretch of above-threshold days. Notable
protest events provide the reader with anchor points are
the 9/11 anniversary protests in 2012 (concurrent with the
Benghazi attacks), the late-June protests leading up to the
Egyptian coup d’e´tat, the riots set off by soccer-fan violence
in early 2012, and the riots after 30 of the fans involved were
sentenced to death which also coincided with riots connected
to the anniversary of the revolution in early 2013.
4.2 Scoring Protest Predictions
We are interested in predicting on each day i whether a
significant protest will occur over the next three days i+1, i+
2, i+ 3 based on information published on or before i. That
is, on each day i we wish to predict whether M ′′c (i+ 2) ≥ θ
(which depends on days i+ 1, i+ 2, i+ 3).
We quantify the success of a predictive mechanism based
on its balanced accuracy. Let Tci ∈ {0, 1}, Pci ∈ {0, 1}
respectively denote whether a significant protest occurs in
country c during the days i+ 1, i+ 2, i+ 3 and whether we
predict there to be one. The true positive rate (TPR) is the
fraction of positive instances (Tci = 1) correctly predicted to
be positive (Pci = 1) and the true negative rate (TNR) is the
fraction of negative instances predicted negative. The bal-
anced accuracy (BAC) is the unweighted average of these:
BAC = (TPR + TNR) /2. BAC, unlike the marginal ac-
curacy, cannot be artificially inflated. Always predicting
“no protest” without using any data will yield a high 94%
marginal accuracy but only 50% balanced accuracy. In fact,
a prediction without any relevant data will always yield a
BAC of 50% on average by statistical independence.
4.3 The Features
We now attempt to quantify the predictive signals we en-
countered anecdotally in Section 2. These features will serve
as the data based on which we make predictions.
In Section 2 we exemplified how the violence in language
surrounding discussion of protest in a country can help set
the context for the danger of a future protest to get out
of hand. Each event mention is rated for violent language
by the fraction of n-grams in the corresponding fragment
(ignoring common words) that match a phrase list. Let
Vcs(i) =
Total violence rating of fragments asso-
ciated with event mentions of protest in
country c extracted from documents pub-
lished on day i from sources of type s
Similarly to the normalization of event mentions due to the
ever-growing source bank, we normalize this quantity as
V ′cs(i) =
Vcs(i)
1
|Countries|×90
∑
c′∈Countries
∑i−1
j=i−90 Vc′s(j)
In addition, forward-looking mentions in mainstream news
and Twitter can help indicate whether a protest is planned
and estimate how many might plan to attend. We have
already definedMcs(i, i+k) which counts this data for k ≥ 1.
In order to facilitate trans-country training, we normalize
these features with respect to the series we would like to
predict, M ′c,Mainstream(i, i). Similar to the normalization of
M ′′c (i), we normalize these features by a per-country con-
stant coefficient
(
M ′c
)−1
.
For the purposes of trans-country training, we hierarchi-
cally cluster the countries using Ward’s method [16] applied
with the distance between two countries c, c′ equal to the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov uniform distance between the distri-
bution functions of the set of training values of M ′′ ignoring
the time dimension. That is, d(c, c′) =
sup
z≥0
∣∣∣∣∣ 1|Train| ∑
i∈Train
(
I
{
z ≥M ′′c (i)
}− I{z ≥M ′′c′(i)})
∣∣∣∣∣
This distance is also a non-parametric test statistic to test
the the hypothesis that two samples were drawn from the
same distribution. We construct b2√|Countries|c clusters
using R function hclust [12]. We include as a feature the
indicator unit vector of cluster membership of the country c
associated with the instance (c, i). Thus the classifier does
not know the particular country about which it is making a
prediction, just its type as characterized by this clustering.
For each instance (c, i) we also include as features the ten
most recent days of same-day reporting on protest in c,
M ′c,Mainstream(i, i)
M ′c
, . . . ,
M ′c,Mainstream(i− 9, i− 9)
M ′c
along with the two most recent differences of these values.
We also include the violence rating in recent mainstream
reporting as the cumulative partial sums of the values
V ′c,Mainstream(i)
M ′c
, . . . ,
V ′c,Mainstream(i− 9)
M ′c
Next we include the counts of mentions of protests said oc-
cur over the next three days, published either in mainstream
news or in Twitter over the ten recent days. We incorporate
this feature as the cumulative partial sums of the values∑3
k=1M
′
cs(i, i+ k)
M ′c
, . . . ,
∑3
k=1M
′
cs(i− 9, i+ k)
M ′c
for s = Mainstream and s = Twitter.
When predicting farther into the future, about the three
days starting with the kth day from today, we push all in-
dexes back by k−1 days, thus excluding any future data and
maintaining the same overall length of the feature vector.
4.4 The Classifier
For the prediction mechanism we employ a random forest
classifier trained on all data up to March 5, 2013. We use
the R library randomForest [9]. The parameters are left at
their default values as set in the library. For example, the
1 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 Days forward
55%
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Balanced accuracy
Figure 3: BAC for predicting protests by distance into the
future using the random forest and the full data-set (blue
and trend in dashed black) and the data-poor predict-like-
today heuristic (red).
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Figure 4: Achievable TPR-FPR rates as we vary the clas-
sification threshold for (left) country-level predictions with
a relative significance scale and (right) city-level predictions
with an absolute significance scale.
defaults dictate that the forest have 500 trees each trained
on b√#featuresc randomly chosen features.
We tune only the threshold required for a positive predic-
tion. If the fraction of trees in the forest voting positive is at
least this threshold then a positive prediction is made, oth-
erwise negative. We tune this by four-fold cross validation
over the training set using the BAC metric.
4.5 Results
We tested the trained random forest on test data March 6,
2013 to July 10, 2013. The results were TPR=75.51% and
TNR=69.31%. BAC, the average of these two, is 72.41%,
which constitutes a 44.8% reduction in balanced error from
having no data. In comparison, predicting for the future the
situation today, simulating the data-poor prediction possible
when one nonetheless has information about today’s situa-
tion (whether from being at the location or from news), has
TPR=27.04%, TNR=93.74%, and BAC=60.39%.
As we attempt to predict farther into the future our pre-
dictions become noisier and closer to the no data case as
the earlier data has less bearing on the far future and there
are fewer reports mentioning events to occur on the days in
question. In Figure 3 we plot the accuracy of making pre-
dictions farther into the future. For each k ≥ 1 we re-train
the random forest with the pushed-back feature vectors.
As we vary the voting threshold, we can (monotonically)
trade off true positives with true negatives. We plot the
range of achievable such rates for our classifier in Figure 4
(left), using the false positive rate (FPR = 1 − TNR) as is
common by convention. The area under the curve (AUC),
here 78.0%, is the probability that a random positive in-
stance has more positive votes than a random negative in-
stance. The fraction of trees voting positive on an instance
could well serve as a risk rating. By randomizing between
two thresholds, we can achieve any weighted average of the
rates. The rates achievable via randomization is the convex
hull of the curve in Figure 4 and has 79.2% under it.
To show the possible breadth of this approach, we can
also consider an alternative forecasting question where we
instead wish to predict protests on the city level and we
define significance on a global scale (see appendix for more
details). That is, a protest is deemed significant if it garners
unusually high same-day mainstream reporting relative to
all cities considered. Using a global scale, the fraction of
trees voting positive serves as an absolute risk rating that
is comparable between cities. The predictability of posi-
tive events also increases because knowing the city alone is
no longer statistically independent of there being a positive
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Figure 5: Predictions of protests in Egypt around the time
of the coup d’e´tat. Yellow to red mark positive predictions
and blue to purple negative, with redder colors indicating
more positive votes in the forest.
event (for example, 23% of positive training instances are in
Cairo). The further localized data also improves predictabil-
ity. On the test data, the random forest yields TPR=84.7%,
TNR=85.7%, BAC=85.2%. The achievable rates as the
voting threshold is varied are shown in Figure 4 (right) with
AUC=91.3% and 91.9% for the convex hull.
4.6 The Case of the Egyptian Coup d’État
To exemplify the prediction mechanism we consider the
case of the 2013 coup d’e´tat in Egypt and the protests sur-
rounding it. Figure 5 depicts the predictions made on dif-
ferent days about different days in the relative future.
As can be seen, the days around June 30 were predicted
positive with very high certainty for a long time prior, the
date ranges in 6/28–7/2 being consistently predicted positive
since June 6, three weeks beforehand (since June 16 onward
shown in figure). Indeed, with a lot of discontent with and
talk of demonstration against President Morsi’s rule, many
protests were anticipated for the weekend of June 30, the
anniversary of Morsi’s rise to the presidency. Even U.S. Sec-
retary of State John Kerry made a statement in anticipation
of protests asking for peaceful and responsible demonstra-
tion on, as he says, Saturday (June 29) and Sunday (June 30)
[15]. Therefore, those days were long predicted positive with
high certainty. However, already on June 28 spontaneous
“warm-up” protests burst in the streets [1]. The first range
to include June 28 was predicted with less certainty, espe-
cially from farther back, but was correctly predicted starting
June 10 except on June 16 when it was mistakenly reported
negative, just slightly below the threshold.
As we now know the protests around the anniversary in-
deed grew very large with many injured and dead in clashes
with police and demonstrators from opposite camps. The
protests did continue and on July 1 the Egyptian army is-
sued an ultimatum to Morsi to resolve the protests within 48
hours or the army would intervene. On July 3 the Egyptian
army led by General Abdul Fatah al-Sisi removed President
Morsi from power. Protests intensified and many more peo-
ple died. As seen in the figure, already on June 28 when the
protests had only just started, before the anniversary and
before any discussion of a possibile ultimatum or coup, the
prediction mechanism had already correctly declared that
significant protests will go on for the weeks to come.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We presented new findings about the power of massive
online-accessible public data to predict crowd behavior. With
much of public discourse having at least some presence on-
line and usually more, the wide range of public data captured
by our efforts offers unparalleled insight into the futures
of countries, cities, and organizations as affected by mass
demonstrations and cyber campaigns (see appendices). The
evidence presented validates and quantifies the common in-
tuition that data on social media (beyond mainstream news
sources) are able to predict major events. The scope and
breadth of the data offered glimpses into tweets in foreign
languages and news in far places. The confluence of all this
information showed trends to come far in the future. We
are excited to make the data used in this study public and
invite further exploration into its predictive abilities.
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7. APPENDIX: PREDICTING PROTESTS ON
THE CITY LEVEL
This appendix provides further detail on the prediction of
protests on the city level and on a common scale of protest
significance. From within the countries considered previ-
ously, we choose the top cities by number of mentions of
protest events. These 37 cities are Jalalabad, Kabul, and
Kandahar in Afghanistan; Manama in Bahrain; Alexandria,
Cairo, Port Said, and Tanta in Egypt; Athens in Greece;
Hyderabad, Mumbai, and New Delhi in India; Jakarta in
Indonesia; Tehran in Iran; Milan and Rome in Italy; Am-
man in Jordan; Beirut and Sidon in Lebanon; Benghazi
and Tripoli in Libya; Abuja and Lagos in Nigeria; Islam-
abad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta in Pakistan;
Qatif and Riyadh in Saudi Arabia; Khartoum in Sudan;
Aleppo, Damascus, Deraa, Hama, and Homs in Syria; Tunis
in Tunisia; and Sana’a and Taiz in Yemen. We consider the
same time range and the same train-test split.
We define M ′ and V ′ as before but for these cities. Since
we are interested in an absolute level of significance we no
longer normalize with respect to the entity, only with re-
spect to the cross-entity average trailing volume. Thus,
while overall still only 6% of instances are labeled positives,
Cairo takes up 23% of positive training instances and 40%
of positive test instances, while Khartoum takes up 1% of
positive train instances and has no positive test instances.
Nonetheless, as before, cities are clustered according to
their set of M ′ training values and the classifier is not knowl-
edgeable of the particular city in question, just its cluster
membership. We use as features the unnormalized violence
rating of past ten days of mainstream reporting about the
city, same-day mainstream reporting level of past ten days,
and the forward-looking mainstream reporting and Twitter
discussion of past ten days. In addition, we include the un-
normalized features of the containing country.
A random forest classifier is trained with the voting frac-
tion threshold tuned by four-fold cross-validation to maxi-
mize balanced accuracy. Any other parameters were set to
their defaults as before. Testing on March 6, 2013 to July 10,
2013, we get a true positive rate of 84.7% and a true nega-
tive rate of 85.7% yielding a balanced accuracy of 85.2%.
The achievable rates as the voting fraction threshold is var-
ied are shown in Figure 4 (right). The area under the ROC
curve (AUC) is 91.3% and the area under its convex hull is
91.9%.
8. APPENDIX: PREDICTING CYBER AT-
TACKS BY SEQUENCE MINING WITH
NAÏVE BAYES
In this appendix we expand our scope and consider all
event types recorded. There are 112 distinct event types in
the data ranging from protest to company acquisition to cy-
ber attack to music album release to voting result. We wish
to be able to predict unusually high numbers of mentions of
a particular type of event involving a particular entity. Here
we focus on cyber attacks. However, there are varying levels
of “clumpiness” for the many classes of events and entities
in terms of how and for how long a real-world event is dis-
cussed online. In addition, it is often hard to hypothesize a
priori what predictive signals may exist. Therefore, in order
to tackle this forecasting problem we would need to spread
a wider net and consider all event interactions and at the
same time allow for more smoothing.
We will therefore consider events on the week level for a
given entity n∗ (which could be a country, a person, an or-
ganization, a product, among many other things) and use
events mentioning that entity to forecast the level of men-
tions of an event type of interest involving that entity next
week. Let
Mn∗es(i, j) =
Number of event mentions of type e involv-
ing entity n∗ taking place on week j ex-
tracted from documents published on week
i from sources of type s
Here we will consider source types Any, Mainstream, Social
Media, and Blog. As before, we normalize this number with
respect to the total event mention volume in the past 12
weeks (approximately three months, as before) in order to
de-trend it as follows
M ′n∗es(i, i+ k) =
Mn∗es(i, i+ k)∑
e′∈EventTypes
∑i−1
j=i−12Mn∗e′s(i, i+ k)
This is the data we will feed to our prediction algorithm.
We will consider both the mentioning over the past weeks of
events taking place in that same week as well as any forward-
looking mentions on a past week of events to take place next
week, the week in question. As before, we will also consider
the case where we must predict farther into the future, about
the week after next or the one after that etc.
We will consider data starting from the first week of 2011
and up to the last week of July 2013. We will test our
mechanism on April 2012 onward, training on the trailing
two years (as available). Any cross-validation is done on
2011 up to March 2012.
8.1 The Ground Set
Along with an entity of interest n∗, let us fix an event
type of interest e∗ and a source type of interest s∗. Because
we believe our data is particularly useful in predicting crowd
behavior we will choose e∗ accordingly. Here we will be in-
terested in predicting politically motivated cyber campaigns
so we fix e∗ = CyberAttack. We label as positive weeks that
included cyber attack campaigns that were so impactful to
generate wide attention all over with same-week mentions
of cyber attack events. Therefore we fix s∗ = Any. We will
consider n∗ that are both country target entities (such as Is-
rael) and hacktivist attacker entities (such as Anonymous).
We also fix a threshold θ and we will wish to predict on
week i whether
M ′n∗e∗s∗(i+, i+) ≥ θ
We fix θ so that 15% of weeks are positive.
As before, we will use balanced accuracy to score our pre-
dictive mechanism and to tune parameters by cross-validation.
8.2 High-Dimensional Sequence Mining with
Naïve Bayes
Let Ti = 1 denote the positivity of the prediction instance
on week i
Ti = 1 : M
′
n∗e∗s∗(i+ 1, i+ 1) ≥ θ
We seek to estimate the conditional probability density con-
ditioned on the past ` weeks
P
Ti = t
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
M ′n∗es(i− k, i− k), M ′n∗es(i− k, i+ 1)
for e ∈ EventTypes,
s ∈ SourceTypes,
k = 0, . . . , `− 1

(1)
for t = 0 or 1. We use ` = 5 here.
That estimate this, we seek to find the patterns of ` event
sequences that end with our target event. Sequence min-
ing is the discovery of commonly repeating sequences in a
string over an alphabet Σ. In bioinformatics, sequence min-
ing is applied to DNA sequences (Σ = {A,C,G, T}) and to
amino acid sequences constituting a protein (|Σ| = 20) to
find common sequences of some length. For longer strings
the frequency of appearing in nature is highly concentrated.
We first bin the values of M ′n∗es(i, i + k) into quartiles
of their marginal distribution over the training data. The
resulting alphabet Σ is of size 42×`×|SourceTypes|×|EventTypes|,
much larger than the training data set so that the proba-
bility function is underspecified (high-dimensional setting).
At the same time, the amount of information in the train-
ing data is also quite massive. So we require a method that
can smooth the density to avoid overfitting and, at the same
time, tractable over a large data set.
One solution to this problem is to apply what is known
as the na¨ıve assumption to our likelihood function (1). Let
F, F ′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (indicating the binned quartile) be any
two different features of the past in the conditioning in (1).
Then we make the following assumption:
Conditioned on Ti, F and F
′ are statistically independent.
This is of course very different from assuming marginal inde-
pendence. For example under the assumption, discussion of
protests or of military actions in Israel in mainstream news
could very often coincide with a discussion on Twitter of a
planned future cyber attack against Israel because a possi-
ble future cyber attack is often a response to the former;
but given that a cyber attack against Israel does occur next
week, we assume the former two must occur independently
from one another.
By Bayes’ theorem we may decompose the probability
function to a product of P (Ti = t) and the conditional prob-
abilities of M ′n∗es(i− k, i− k) and M ′n∗es(i− k, i+ 1) given
Ti = t. Estimating instead the marginal distribution of T
and the conditional distributions of M ′ by maximum like-
lihood (counting co-occurrences in training data) results in
the well known na¨ıve Bayes probability estimator. This re-
duces the variance of the density estimator but introduces
bias whenever the na¨ıve assumption does not hold exactly.
To further relieve issues of the sparsity of positives in our
data, instead of estimating the conditional probabilities by
maximum likelihood, we take a Bayesian approach and as-
sume a Dirichlet prior with symmetric concentration param-
eter α. The prior is our probabilistic belief about the value of
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Figure 6: In dark blue, the balanced accuracy of predicting
cyber attacks against Israel by distance into the future.
Targets BAC Perpetrators BAC
Israel 68.9% Anonymous 70.3%
Germany 65.4% AnonGhost 70.8%
South Korea 63.1% LulzSec 60.6%
United Kingdom 65.5% Guccifer 66.7%
Table 2: Accuracy of predicting cyber attacks against and
by a selection of entities.
these conditional probabilities in the absence of data. Being
the conjugate prior to the categorical distribution, a Dirich-
let law will also be the distribution for the posterior distribu-
tion. Estimating the parameters by maximum a posteriori
likelihood is then equivalent to estimating the probabilities
by counting frequencies from the data and padding these
counts each by α. We estimate the marginal P (Ti = 1) using
maximum likelihood because that estimation is not plagued
by sparsity.
Estimating the conditional probabilities thus is then done
simply by counting data which can be done exceedingly fast.
For each event, source, and look-back k, one simply counts
occurrences in bins of the feature and keeps such tallies sep-
arately for when k + 1 weeks forward (only if within the
training data) has been positive or negative. The computa-
tion involved in this procedure scales as the product of the
length of the data and the number of features.
To make a prediction we check whether (1) ≥ p∗ for a cho-
sen threshold p∗. Due to the bias introduced by making the
na¨ıve assumption, we select p∗ by four-fold cross-validation
on the training data (up to March 2012) to maximize bal-
anced accuracy.
8.3 Results
We first apply this method to predicting cyber campaigns
against Israel. For reference, most of these are perpetrated
by groups AnonGhost and Anonymous under the banner
of #OpIsrael. Testing on April 2012 to July 2013, we get
a true positive rate of 70.0% and a true negative rate of
67.8% giving a balanced accuracy of 68.9%. Our accuracy
diminishes as we try to predict farther into the future, as
depicted in Figure 6.
By inspecting the trained conditional probabilities we can
see which were the most impactful features to sway our belief
one way or the other. In this case, swaying our belief most
toward predicting positively were if many blog and main-
stream mentions of cyber attack appeared in recent weeks
and if many social media mentions of protest in Israel ap-
peared in recent weeks as well as forward-looking mentions
on social media of a protest in the week to come.
We apply the same method to predicting attacks against
three other country entities and to predicting campaigns per-
petrated by a selection of four hacktivist groups. The results
are reported in Table 2.
Where hacktivism campaigns are often reactions to devel-
opments that do not necessarily at first involve the hacktivist
organization, incorporating in some way event mentions in-
volving other entities could boost performance. However, it
is not immediately clear how to do so without introducing
too many redundant and obfuscating features that will re-
sult in overfitting and poor out-of-sample accuracy. Using
abstractions as in [13] is one possible way to improve this
method.
